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Abstract
We define an intergenerational social welfare function ∗Σ from RN (the set
of all infinite-horizon utility streams) into ∗R (the ordered field of hyperreal
numbers). The function ∗Σ is continuous, linear, and increasing, and is well-
defined even on unbounded (e.g. exponentially increasing) utility streams. This
yields a complete social welfare ordering on RN which is Pareto and treats all
generations equally (i.e. does not discount future utility). In particular, it is
what Chichilnisky (1996) calls a ‘sustainable’ preference ordering: it is neither
a ‘dictatorship of the present’ nor a ‘dictatorship of the future’.
We then show how an agent with no ‘pure’ time preferences may still ‘infor-
mationally discount’ the future, due to uncertainty. Last, we model intergen-
erational choice for an exponentially growing economy and population. In one
parameter regime, our model shows ‘instrumental discounting’ due to declining
marginal utility of wealth. In another regime, we see a disturbing ‘Paradox of
Eternal Deferral’.
If the consequences of economic decisions unfold over time, then these decisions
require tradeoffs between payoffs at one time and payoffs at later times. A rational
economic agent must have some systematic way to evaluate these tradeoffs; this is the
problem of intertemporal choice. Likewise, society as a whole must make long-term
plans (e.g. investments in infrastructure or environmental protection) which affect the
welfare of future generations; this is the problem of intergenerational choice.
In most economic models, each agent makes intertemporal choices by maximizing a
discounted sum of future expected utilities. Formally, the agent fixes some discounting
sequence1 d = (dt)
∞
t=0 ∈ `1, where `1 :=
{
d ∈ RN6− ;
∑∞
t=0 dt <∞
}
. The ‘present value’
1Normally, dt := λt, where λ ∈ (0, 1) is some discount factor. Indeed, such exponential discounting
is required for time-consistency (Caplin and Leahy, 2004).
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of any expected utility stream u = (ut)
∞
t=0 ∈ RN is then defined by 〈d,u〉 :=
∑∞
t=0 dtut.
The agent chooses the strategy with the maximal present value.
While this discounted sum might be appropriate for the intertemporal choice by
an impatient individual, it is arguably inappropriate as an intergenerational welfare
function (IGWF) for a society, because it systematically discriminates against future
generations. Indeed, Cowen and Parfit (1992), Chichilnisky (1996) and others have
argued that the inappropriate application of exponential discounting to intergenera-
tional choice would lead to environmentally unsustainable policies: if we applied a 3%
discount rate (which is typical for an individual), then even catastrophic long-term
environmental consequences (e.g. due to global warming) would be ‘discounted’ into
insignificance, and hence, would have no influence on present-day economic planning.
Chichilnisky (1996) calls such a myopic IGWF a ‘dictatorship of the present’ . How-
ever, people are in fact quite concerned about global warming; this indicates that this
is not how they implicitly think about intergenerational choice.
Chichilnisky argues that we need a different IGWF, which properly accounts for
the far-future consequences of our actions. However, it is also inappropriate for the
IGWF to focus entirely on long-term consequences (e.g. to maximize lim inft→∞ ut),
while ignoring short-term consequences; Chichilnisky (1996) calls such an IGWF a
‘dictatorship of the future’. Instead, we need a balanced approach (she calls this a
‘sustainable’ IGWF). Let U := [−1, 1]∞, so that UN is the space of all utility streams
uniformly bounded by 1; Chichilnisky shows that, if χ : UN−→R is a continuous, linear
IGWF, then χ is sustainable if and only if
∀ u ∈ UN, χ(u) = 〈d,u〉+
∫
N
u dφ, (1)
where d = (dt)
∞
t=0 ∈ `1 is some summable discounting sequence, and φ : P(N)−→R
is a purely finitely additive (PFA) measure on N. A PFA measure assign zero mass
to all finite subsets of N; thus,
∫
N u dφ is only sensitive to the asymptotic properties
of the sequence (ut)
∞
t=0 as t→∞. For example, Chichilnisky suggests that we use a
PFA measure obtained by defining
∫
N u dφ := limt→∞ ut whenever this limit exists,
and then extending
∫
dφ to all of UN via the Hahn-Banach Theorem.
However, Chichilnisky’s function χ still has some shortcomings. First of all, al-
though it avoids dictatorship of the present and of the future, χ still does not treat
all generations equally: near-future generations are favoured by the discounted sum
〈d, •〉, whereas extreme far-future generations are favoured by the PFA measure φ.
Intermediate generations are favoured by neither. In short: χ is not invariant under
permutation of generations. Another problem is that χ is only well-defined for uni-
formly bounded utility streams. However, intergenerational choice must allow for the
possible long-term growth of either the population, or per capita income, or both;
hence we must allow for the possibility that the (population-weighted) aggregate ex-
pected utility stream (ut)
∞
t=0 grows without bound (perhaps even exponentially). Thus,
to be useful, an IGWF must be able to compare two unbounded utility streams.
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In §1 we will develop such an IGWF, and in §4 we will apply it to an economy with
exponential growth. Before that, in §2 we briefly discuss how discounting can arise
without pure time preferences. We elaborate on this idea in §3, where we consider
‘informational discounting’ due to uncertainty.
1 A hyperreal, nondiscounted sum of future utili-
ties
A free ultrafilter on N is a collection F of subsets of N such that:
(a) If A,B ∈ F , then A ∩B ∈ F .
(b) If A ∈ F and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F .
(c) If A is finite, then A 6∈ F . (In particular, ∅ 6∈ F).
(d) For any A ⊆ N, either A or A{ is in F [but not both, because of (a) and (c)].
It helps to visualize this topologically. The Stone-Cˇech compactification of N is a
compact Hausdorff space βN along with a dense embedding N ↪→ βN; in a certain sense
βN is the ‘largest’ compact Hausdorff space into which N can be densely embedded.
Thus, elements of (βN) \ N are cluster points of N which lie just outside of N itself;
they are like ‘cluster points at infinity’. If F is any free ultrafilter, then there is a
unique n˜ ∈ (βN) \N such that F is the set of all neighbourhoods of n˜. If F ∈ F , and
some property holds for all n ∈ F, then this property holds ‘in the limit’ as n→n˜.
Let F be a free ultrafilter on N, and define the relation ∼F on RN by x ∼F y iff
{n ∈ N ; xn = yn} ∈ F . Then ∗R := RN/∼F is the set of hyperreal (or nonstandard
real) numbers.2 For any x ∈ RN, let [x] ∈ ∗R be its ∼F -equivalence class. There is a
natural embedding R 3 r 7→ ∗r ∈ ∗R, where ∗r := [(r, r, r, . . .)]. For any [x], [y] ∈ ∗R,
we write [x] ≤∗ [y] if {n ∈ N ; xn ≤ yn} ∈ F . Then ≤∗ is well-defined, and defines
a total ordering on ∗R. We define [x] +∗ [y] := [(x0 + y0, x1 + y1, x2 + y2, . . .)], and
−∗ [x] := [(−x0,−x1,−x2, . . .)]. We can define multiplication and division similarly;
then ∗R is a totally ordered field, and the embedding R−→ ∗R is a monomorphism.
For any u := (ut)
∞
t=0 ∈ RN, we define ∗
∑
u := [x], where x ∈ RN is defined
by xn :=
n∑
t=0
ut for all n ∈ N. This defines a linear function ∗
∑
: RN−→ ∗R. For
example, if (ut)
∞
t=0 is an expected utility stream, then
∗∑u is the nondiscounted
total lifetime utility. Such a nondiscounted sum generally does not converge to a real
number, but it does converge to a well-defined hyperreal number. Thus, if N indexes an
infinite sequence of generations, so that ut represents the expected aggregate utility of
2Up to isomorphism, this definition does not depend on the choice of ultrafilter F . See Rashid
(1987), Anderson (1991) or Arkeryd et al. (1997) for introductions to hyperreal numbers and non-
standard analysis.
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generation t, then the function ∗
∑
: RN−→ ∗R is an intergenerational welfare function
(IGWF). This leads to a complete intergenerational welfare ordering  on RN. For
any utility streams u = (ut)
∞
t=0 and v = (vt)
∞
t=0 ∈ RN,(
u  v
)
⇐⇒
(
∗∑u ≤∗ ∗∑v) ⇐⇒
({
n ∈ N ;
n∑
t=0
ut ≤
n∑
t=0
vt
}
∈ F
)
.
This is similar to the ‘overtaking’ criterion of von Weizacker (1967), but restricted to
the ultrafilter F , so that it defines a complete ordering on RN. As an intergenerational
welfare function, ∗
∑
has several nice properties.
Pareto property. If ut ≥ vt for all t ∈ N, and ut > vt for at least one t ∈ N, then
clearly ∗
∑
u > ∗
∑
v. In particular, ∗
∑
is strictly increasing in each coordinate.
Intergenerational egalitarianism. ∗
∑
treats all generations equally. To be precise,
let σ : N−→N be a bijection, and let S := {n ∈ N ; σ([1...n]) = [1...n]}. We say σ is
an F -semifinite permutation if S ∈ F . For example:
• Suppose σ(t) = t for all but finitely many t ∈ N; then σ is F -semifinite.
• Let E := {0, 2, 4, . . .} and O := {1, 3, 5, . . .} be the sets of even and odd numbers;
then either E ∈ F or O ∈ F (but not both). If O ∈ F , then define σ(n) := n−1
if n ∈ O and σ(n) := n + 1 if n ∈ E; then σ is F -semifinite (with S = O). If
E ∈ F , then let σ(0) := 0, and for all n ≥ 1, define σ(n) := n− 1 if n ∈ E and
σ(n) := n + 1 if n ∈ O; then σ is again F -semifinite (with S = E). In either
case, we have σ(O) ⊆ E and σ(E \ {0}) ⊆ O.
Let u := (ut)
∞
t=0, and define vt := uσ(t) for all t ∈ N. Then ∗
∑
v = ∗
∑
u (because for
any n ∈ S, we have ∑nt=0 vt = ∑nt=0 ut, and S ∈ F). In other words, ∗∑ is invariant
under any F -semifinite permutation of generations. (Note that neither the discounted
sum 〈d, •〉 nor the function χ in eqn.(1) have this property).
Handles exponential economic growth. ∗
∑
u is well-defined even if the utility stream
(ut)
∞
t=0 grows without bound. In contrast, the function χ in eqn.(1) requires u to be
uniformly bounded. The discounted sum 〈d, •〉 also has problems: if the exponential
growth rate of u exceeds the discount rate of d, then 〈d,u〉 =∞.
Infinitesimal impatience. The discounted sum 〈d, •〉 is ‘impatient’ in the sense that
it prefers immediate payoffs to future ones. Since ∗
∑
is a nondiscounted sum of future
utilities, it exhibits no ‘real’ impatience; however it does exhibit some ‘infinitesimal’
impatience, as follows. Let u = (ut)
∞
t=0 and v = (vt)
∞
t=0 and R ∈ R be such that
∞∑
t=0
ut = R =
∞∑
t=0
vt, (where
∞∑
t=0
ut := lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
ut, etc., as usual). (2)
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Suppose, however, that
∑T
t=0 ut <
∑T
t=0 vt for all T ∈ N. (For example, suppose
(vt)
∞
t=0 ∈ RN+ is a strictly positive sequence, and u0 := 0 and ut := vt−1 for all t > 0;
then
∑T
t=0 ut =
∑T−1
t=0 vt <
∑T
t=0 vt. )
Equation (2) suggests that ∗
∑
u = ∗R = ∗
∑
v, but this is not the case. If∑T
t=0 ut <
∑T
t=0 vt for all T , then it is easy to see that
∗∑u <∗ ∗∑v. The difference
 := ∗
∑
v − ∗∑u is an infinitesimal; that is,  is a hyperreal number such that
∗0 <∗  <∗
∗r for any real number r > 0. Thus, ∗
∑
does prefer the expected utility
stream v over u by an infinitesimal amount, reflecting the fact that, although both
streams deliver the same total expected utility, v delivers it slightly sooner.
Continuity. The function ∗
∑
: RN−→ ∗R is not continuous in the (Tychonoff)
product topology on RN —indeed, there is no function from RN to ∗R which is Pareto,
invariant under finite coordinate permutations, and continuous in the product topology
(Efimov and Koshevoy, 1994; Lauwers, 1997a). Neither is ∗
∑
continuous in the
Mackey topology. In fact, as Bewley (1970) observed, if a preference ordering on
RN is continuous in the product or Mackey topologies, then it must be ‘myopic’ in
a certain precise sense. [The set of all such ‘myopia-inducing’ topologies on RN was
characterized by Brown and Lewis (1981).]
Also, unlike Chichilnisky’s IGWF χ in eqn.(1), ∗
∑
is not continuous in the `∞
norm topology on [−1, 1]N. However, ∗∑ does satisfy a strictly weaker form of conti-
nuity. Let d1 : RN×RN−→R∪ {∞} be the `1 pseudometric d1(u,v) :=
∑∞
t=0 |ut− vt|
(‘pseudo’ because d(u,v) could be infinite). Let de :
∗R × ∗R−→R be the Euclidean
metric3: de(x, y) := inf {r ∈ R ; −r < x− y < r}. Then ∗
∑
is (d1, de)-continuous.
No dictatorship of the present or the future. Let U ⊆ R be a set of admissible utility
levels (e.g. in Chichilnisky (1996), U := [−1, 1]; in our model, U := R). For any u =
(ut)
∞
t=0 ∈ UN and T ∈ N, let uT := (ut)Tt=0 and uT := (ut)∞t=T+1. If v = (vt)∞t=0 ∈ UN,
let (uT ,vT ) := (wt)
∞
t=0, where wt := ut, ∀ t ≤ T and wt := vt, ∀ t > T .
If Φ : UN−→R is an IGWF, and u,v ∈ UN, then Φ myopically prefers u to v
if Φ(u) > Φ(v) and there is some T ∈ N such that, for any u˜, v˜ ∈ UN, we have
Φ(uT , u˜T ) > Φ(v
T , v˜T ). In other words, the fact that u is socially preferred to v is
entirely determined by the short-term structure of u and v —their long-term properties
are irrelevant. Chichilnisky (1996) calls Φ a ‘dictatorship of the present’ if, for all
u,v ∈ UN, if Φ(u) > Φ(v) then Φ myopically prefers u to v. For example, if d ∈ `1
is any summable discount sequence, and U is a bounded set, then the IGWF 〈d, •〉
is a dictatorship of the present (Chichilnisky, 1996, Thm.1). (Note that this is false
if U is unbounded). We will actually weaken Chichilnisky’s definition somewhat: If
Φ : UN−→ ∗R is an IGWF, we will say that Φ is a weak dictatorship of the present if
there exist some u,v ∈ UN such that Φ(u) >∗ Φ(v) and Φ myopically prefers u to v.
3Note for each x ∈ R there exist points y ∈ ∗R such that x 6= y but de(x, y) = 0 —i.e. y is
‘infinitesimally close’ to x. This is one of the peculiarities of nonstandard topology.
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If Φ : UN−→R is an IGWF, and u,v ∈ UN, then Φ eternally prefers u to v if
Φ(u) > Φ(v) and there is some T ∈ N such that, for any u˜, v˜ ∈ UN, we have
Φ(u˜T ,uT ) > Φ(v˜
T ,vT ). In other words, the fact that u is socially preferred to v is
entirely determined by the long-term structure of u and v —their short-term properties
are irrelevant. Chichilnisky (1996) calls Φ a ‘dictatorship of the future’ if for all u,v ∈
UN, if Φ(u) > Φ(v) then Φ eternally prefers u to v. For example, Φ(u) := lim inf
t→∞
ut
is a dictatorship of the future (Chichilnisky, 1996, Thm.1).
We must modify Chichilnisky’s definition slightly to account for the possibility of
hyperreal social welfare. If r ∈ ∗R, then r is hyperfinite if r >∗ ∗n for all n ∈ N, or if
−r >∗ ∗n for all n ∈ N. Otherwise, r is finite. Thus, all real numbers are finite, and a
real number plus an infinitesimal hyperreal is still finite.
If Φ : UN−→ ∗R is a (hyperreal) IGWF, then we say that Φ is weak dictatorship
of the future if there exist u,v ∈ UN with Φ(u) >∗ Φ(v), such that Φ(u) −∗ Φ(v) finite,
but Φ eternally prefers u to v. Note that, if Φ(u) −∗ Φ(v) is hyperfinite, then Φ
may eternally prefer u to v without being a dictatorship of the present —this seems
reasonable, since the disparity between Φ(u) and Φ(v) is so large. Note also that,
if Φ : UN−→R is a (real-valued) IGWF, then the ‘finiteness’ condition is vacuously
true, so that our definition of ‘dictatorship’ is then strictly weaker than Chichilnisky’s.
Thus, the property of ‘nondictatorship’ is stronger in our model than in hers.
Proposition 1 Let U ⊆ R be any nonsingleton set. Then ∗∑ is neither a weak
dictatorship of the present, nor a weak dictatorship of the future on UN.
Proof: Let x, y ∈ U with x < y. Let x := (x, x, x, . . .) ∈ UN and y := (y, y, y, . . .) ∈ UN.
To see nondictatorship of the present, let u,v ∈ UN, and suppose ∗∑u >∗ ∗∑v. We
claim that ∗
∑
does not myopically prefer u to v. Indeed, for any T ∈ N, we will
show that ∗
∑
(uT ,xT ) <∗
∗∑(vT ,yT ). To see this, let UN := ∑Nn=0(uT ,xT )n and
VN :=
∑N
n=0(v
T ,yT )n for all N ∈ N, and let U := (UN)∞N=0 and V := (VN)∞N=0;
hence ∗
∑
(uT ,xT ) = [U] and
∗∑(vT ,yT ) = [V]. Let W := ∑Tt=0(ut − vt), and
z := y−x > 0. Then for all N > T+W/z, we have VN = UN + (N−T )z−W > UN .
Thus, {N ∈ N ; VN > UN} is cofinite, hence in F ; thus [V] >∗ [U].
To see nondictatorship of the future, let u,v ∈ UN. Suppose ∗∑u > ∗∑v, but
∗∑u− ∗∑v is finite. We claim that ∗∑ does not eternally prefer u to v.
If ∗
∑
u − ∗∑v is finite, then there is some B ∈ N and F ∈ F such that −B <∑T
t=0 ut−
∑T
t=0 vt < B, ∀ T ∈ F. Thus −2B <
∑N
t=T ut−
∑N
t=T vt < 2B, ∀ T,N ∈ F.
Thus, if 0 := (0, 0, 0, . . .), then − ∗2B < ∗∑(0T ,uT )− ∗∑(0T ,vT ) < ∗2B, ∀ T ∈ F.
Let x < y and z := y − x > 0 as before. If T := 1 + d2B/ze, then Tz > 2B. Thus,
∗∑(yT ,vT ) −∗ ∗∑(xT ,uT ) = ∗
(
T∑
t=0
(y − x)
)
+∗
∗∑(0T ,vT ) −∗ ∗∑(0T ,uT )
>∗
∗(Tz) −∗
∗2B >∗
∗2B −∗
∗2B = ∗0.
Thus, ∗
∑
(yT ,vT ) >∗
∗∑(xT ,uT ), so ∗∑ does not eternally prefer u to v. 2
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Previous work. Nondiscounted, infinite-horizon, intergenerational social choice is
similar to the problem of constructing a nondictatorial social choice function for a
countably infinite population; this has been studied by Fishburn (1970), Candeal et al.
(1992), Efimov and Koshevoy (1994), Lauwers (1993, 1997a,b), and others, and some
solutions use ultrafilters (although none involve hyperreal numbers). For example,
Chichilnisky and Heal (1997) constructed a social choice rule Ψ : XN−→X (where
X was a topological space of preferences) that was continuous, respected unanimity,
and nondictatorial (but not anonymous), by defining Ψ(x) to be limit of the sequence
x := (x1, x2, . . .) along a free ultrafilter in N. More generally, Kirman and Sondermann
(1972) and Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995) have shown that every voting rule over
a countable population is equivalent to an ultraproduct defined by some ultrafilter
on N. Campbell (1990) used ultrafilters to prove versions of Arrow’s and Wilson’s
impossibility theorems for infinite-horizon intergenerational social choice.
Practicalities. To apply the IGWF ∗
∑
: RN−→ ∗R, we need a concrete realization of
∗R, which requires an explicit specification of a free ultrafilter F . Here we run into a
practical problem: it is essentially impossible to explicitly specify a free ultrafilter; the
proof of their existence is inextricably nonconstructive and uses the Axiom of Choice.4
However, in many cases it may be sufficient to simply know that F exists.
Given two utility streams u,v ∈ RN, let S :=
{
T ∈ N ; ∑Tt=0 ut >∑Tt=0 vt}; then
∗∑u >∗ ∗∑v if and only if S ∈ F . There are three possibilities: either S is finite, or
S is cofinite (i.e. S{ is finite), or neither. Now, we know that F contains all cofinite
sets, so if S is cofinite, then we know ∗
∑
u >∗
∗∑v, whereas if S is finite, then
∗∑u <∗ ∗∑v. For example, suppose there are long-term equilibria U, V such that
ut −−−→t→∞ U and vt −−−→t→∞ V (as in §3 below). If U > V , then necessarily ∗
∑
u >∗
∗∑v,
even if
∑10000
t=0 ut 
∑10000
t=0 vt. (For example, V might represent a future where short-
term overconsumption leads to a long-term environmental catastrophe, whereas U
represents a future where this catastrophe is averted). Likewise, if U < V , then
∗∑u <∗ ∗∑v. If U = V , then we must look at short-term forecasts. For example,
suppose there is some T ∈ N such that ∑Tt=0 ut >∑Tt=0 vt while ut = vt for all t ≥ T .
Or suppose there exists T ∈ N and  > 0 such that ∑Tt=0 ut >  + ∑Tt=0 vt, while∑∞
t=T+1 |ut − vt| < . In either case, clearly ∗
∑
u >∗
∗∑v.
But suppose that U = V and neither u nor v clearly dominates the other. Or
suppose the sequences (ut)
∞
t=0 and (vt)
∞
t=0 do not converge to long-term equilibria at
all. Then S is neither finite nor cofinite; the situation is more ambiguous. Presumably
we can only determine a finite fragment of S; perhaps we can only estimate
∑T
t=0 ut
and
∑T
t=0 vt for T ≤ 104. We must guess whether S ∈ F , knowing only S ∩ [1...104].
If U ⊆ N, its lower Cesa`ro density is defined d(U) := lim infT→∞ |U ∩ [1...T ]|/T ;
clearly 0 ≤ d(U) ≤ 1. If D := {U ⊆ N ; d(U) = 1}, then there is a free ultrafilter
which contains D (this follows from Zorn’s Lemma, because D itself is a free filter).
4A similar problem aﬄicts the IGWF χ in eqn. (1); specifying a Hahn-Banach extension of lim is
equivalent to specifying a free ultrafilter. See also Chichilnisky and Heal (1997).
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So, assume without loss of generality that F ⊃ D. Thus, if |S ∩ [1...104]| /104 ≈ 1,
then this suggests that d(S) = 1, which implies that S ∈ F , and hence ∗∑u >∗ ∗∑v.
There are two problems with this approach: (i) There is no lower bound on the
speed with which |S∩[1...T ]|/T converges to d(S); hence the fact that |S ∩ [1...104]| /104 ≈
1 proves nothing. (ii) What if |S ∩ [1...104]| /104 ≈ 0.5? What then? In this case, our
forecasts are sufficiently ambiguous that the best response is probably to be indifferent
between u and v. Presumably, in most situations, the contrast between forecasts will
be starker, and our choice will be clearer.
2 Discounting without time preferences
To make intertemporal choices under uncertainty, an agent compares different sce-
narios which generate different time-sequences of future expected utility. This future
utility is determined by the future values of ‘instrumental’ variables such as consump-
tion or income. We say the agent exhibits pure time preferences if the agent discounts
future expected utility itself (e.g. due to ‘impatience’ or ‘myopia’). However, even
without pure time preferences, the agent may discount instrumental variables, because
their values are increasing over time (e.g. due to economic growth) while offering
diminishing marginal utility (e.g. because utility is a concave function of income). We
call this instrumental discounting; we will mathematically model it in §4.
For example, suppose U(y) = log(y), where U is utility and y is income. Then
U ′(y) = 1/y. Thus, if I expect my income in 2038 to be double my income in 2008,
then each dollar of additional income in 2038 yields half the marginal utility of an
additional dollar in 2008; hence in 2008 I will discount 2038 marginal income by 50%,
even if do not discount 2038 utility itself at all. (However, if I expect to be poorer in
2038, then I will actually value 2038 income more than 2008 income).
An agent may also discount the future due to uncertainty. If future utility depends
on the future value of instrumental variables, then intertemporal decisions require
predictions about these variables. These predictions are always uncertain, and this
uncertainty increases as the prediction date moves further into the future. Thus, the
expected utility in the far future converges to some equilibrium value which is often
more or less independent of the details of short-term decisions. Thus, even without
pure time preferences or instrumental discounting, the agent’s intertemporal decisions
may seem to ‘discount’ the long-term consequences of her actions —not because the
agent doesn’t care about these consequences, but simply because the agent has no way
of predicting (and hence optimizing) these consequences. We call this informational
discounting; we will mathematically model it in §3.
Cowen and Parfit (1992) and others have argued that a social planner should
have no pure time-preferences: the utility of future people is just as important as
the utility of present people. In §1 we constructed an IGWF ∗∑ with this property.
Arguably, individuals should also have no pure time preferences: your future utility
is just as important as your present utility. It is true that people exhibit a nonzero
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discount rate (e.g. they borrow money at positive real interest rates); furthermore,
many models of intertemporal choice require discounting for equilibria to exist.5 But
this can be explained as informational or instrumental discounting, without any pure
time preferences.
3 Informational discounting due to burgeoning un-
certainty
Suppose the agent’s utility is described by a function Υ : A×N×X−→R, where A is
a set of ‘strategies’ (controlled by the agent) and X is a set of exogenous ‘world states’
(not controlled by the agent), and where Υat (x) := Υ(a, t, x) is the utility obtained
from state x at time t, assuming strategy a was chosen at time zero.6
Suppose that the world-state changes over time according to a Markov process.
Formally, let P(X) be the space of all probability measures over X , and let Φ :
P(X)−→P(X) be a linear transformation (the transition probability operator), so that,
if ρt ∈ P(X) is the probability distribution of an unknown world-state at time t, then
ρt+1 := Φ(ρt) will be the resulting probability distribution of the unknown world-state
at time t + 1. In particular, if the state of the system at time t = 0 is known to
be x ∈ X , then the probability distribution at time t = 1 is Φ(δx) (where δx is the
pointmass at x), and the distribution at time t = 2 is Φ2(δx), and so on.
A probability measure η ∈ P(X) is stationary if Φ(η) = η —that is, η is an
eigenvector of Φ with eigenvalue 1. Under fairly general conditions, Φ admits a unique
stationary measure η, which is a globally attracting fixed point for the action of Φ
on P(X); this is the Perron-Frobenius Theorem.7 Let Spec(Φ) ⊂ C be the set of all
eigenvalues of Φ, and let λ := sup {|c| ; c ∈ Spec(Φ) and c 6= 1}. If λ < 1, then for
any ρ0 ∈ P(X), if ρt := Φt(ρ0) for all t ∈ N, then we have
‖ρt − η‖1 ≤ λt ‖ρ0 − η‖1 −−−→t→∞ 0, (3)
where ‖•‖1 is the total variation norm on P(X). In other words, the sequence {ρt}∞t=0
converges to η exponentially.
Let x˜ := (x˜t)
∞
t=0 ∈ XN be a random path from this Markov process. Any strategy
a ∈ A determines a random utility stream u˜a := (u˜at )∞t=0 ∈ RN, where u˜at := Υat (x˜t). If
ρt is the distribution of x˜t, then the expected value of u˜t is given by
uat :=
∫
X
Υat (x) dρt[x].
5See e.g. Araujo (1985) for the ‘need for impatience’ in intertemporal exchange economies, or
Muthoo (1999) for the role of discounting in ‘alternating offers’ bargaining models.
6The agent commits to a at time zero, but she executes a over time; thus a could include contingent
clauses like ‘If the state becomes x at time t, then do the following at time t+ 1’. However, it is also
possible that the actions dictated by a before time t will constrain the agent’s options at time t+ 1,
e.g. due to sunk costs, contractual commitments, etc.
7See e.g (Lind and Marcus, 1995, Thm 4.2.3) or (Borkar, 1995, Thm. 5.3.2).
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Let U
a
t :=
∫
X
Υat (x) dη[x] and let M
a
t := ‖Υat ‖∞, and assume that the sequence
{Mat }∞t=0 is bounded or grows at most subexponentially. Then
|uat − Uat | =
∣∣∣∣∫
X
Υat (x) d(ρt − η)[x]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Mat ‖ρt − η‖1
≤
(3)
Mat λ
t ‖ρ0 − η‖1 −−−→t→∞ 0 (exponentially). (4)
For any a, b ∈ A, if lim inft→∞(Uat −U bt) > 0, then a asymptotically dominates b: with-
out any knowledge of the future except for η, we can see that a is a better long-term
strategy. An infinitely patient agent would never choose an asymptotically dominated
strategy; hence we can assume without loss of generality that all asymptotically dom-
inated strategies have already been eliminated from A. Thus, for all a, b ∈ A, we have
limt→∞ |Uat −U bt | = 0 —neither a nor b asymptotically dominates the other. Combin-
ing this with eqn.(4), we conclude that |uat −ubt | −−−→t→∞ 0. (Indeed, if U
a
t = 0 = U
b
t for all
a, b ∈ A and t ∈ N, as in the two examples below, then |uat −ubt | −−−→t→∞ 0 exponentially).
This means: given only information about the present (encoded in ρ0), the choice
between a and b will be decided mainly by the short-term behaviour of the expected
utility streams (uat )
∞
t=0 and (u
b
t)
∞
t=0; hence the agent behaves as if she discounts the
long-term future. We will illustrate this with two examples.
3.1 Mortality. Let X := {0, 1}, where 1 represents ‘alive’ and 0 represents ‘dead’.
Thus, P(X) := {(p0, p1) ∈ R26− ; p0 + p1 = 1}. Let Φ : P(X)−→P(X) be the linear
transformation with matrix
[
1 d
0 1−d
]
. In other words, a living person has a proba-
bility d of dying during each period; a dead person stays dead. This Poisson process
roughly describes the problem faced by a mortal human who cannot predict her own
mortality. The unique stationary probability measure is η = δ0, and the maximal
nonunit eigenvalue is λ = 1 − d. Suppose that, for all a ∈ A, Υat (0) = 0 and
Υat (1) = u
a
t > 0. Then, having chosen strategy a at time zero, the expected utility at
time t is uat = λ
tuat . Thus, the expected lifetime utility resulting from strategy a is
∗∑∞
t=0 λ
tuat —the traditional exponentially discounted sum of future utility.
For example, suppose a, b ∈ A are two ‘investment strategies’. Assume a repre-
sents ‘unsustainable immediate gratification’, so that (uat )
∞
t=0 is a sequence decreasing
to zero, whereas b represents ‘profitable long-term investment’, so that (ubt)
∞
t=0 is a
sequence increasing to infinity. However, suppose that b also requires some short-term
sacrifice, so that ubt < u
a
t for all t ∈ [1...T ]. Then it is quite easy to construct exam-
ples where
∑∞
t=0 λ
tubt <
∑∞
t=0 λ
tuat —in other words, a mortal might rationally choose
immediate gratification over long-term investment.
Besides mortal humans, the Poisson process is also relevant to intertemporal choice
by firms, for two reasons. (1) Firms exist to generate dividends for human sharehold-
ers, who (being mortal) want the dividends now, rather than later. (2) A firm itself
is ‘mortal’: it might go bankrupt (with little warning), at which point its assets will
be liquidated to pay creditors, and the shareholders will likely get nothing. Because
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of this risk, shareholders again prefer dividends now, rather than later.
The Poisson process can also induce exponential discounting in other intertemporal
economic activities susceptible to sudden, exogenous termination. For example, in
‘alternating offers’ models of bargaining (Muthoo, 1999), the state 0 might represent
the sudden termination of negotiations because the counterparty has received a better
‘outside offer’. For a social planner, the state 0 might represent apocalypse.
3.2 Mean Reversion. Let X := Rn, where each coordinate represents some eco-
nomically relevant variable (e.g. weather conditions, commodity prices, etc.). An
Rn-valued Markov process is mean-reverting if it has a unique, exponentially attract-
ing stationary probability measure η ∈ P(Rn) with a finite mean. After a change
of coordinates we can assume this mean is 0. (The most familiar example is the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, a random walk which exponentially ‘tries to converge’ to
0, while being constantly perturbed by Gaussian random noise. In this case, η is a
multivariate normal distribution with mean 0.)
If (x˜t)
∞
t=0 ∈ (Rn)N is a random path from a mean-reverting process, and xt ∈
Rn is the conditional expectation of x˜t given knowledge of x˜0, then limt→∞ xt = 0,
independent of the value of x˜0. For any a ∈ A and t ∈ N, suppose that Υat : Rn−→R
is a linear utility function, with spectral radius bounded by some M < ∞. Then
uat := Υ
a
t (xt) −−−→t→∞ 0 for all a ∈ A. That is: for any strategy and any initial condition,
the long-term expected utility is zero.
For example, suppose a is a business strategy and Υ is profit. If uat −−−→t→∞ 0, then a
might generate positive expected profits in the short term, but it will converge to zero
expected profits in the long term. This describes innovation-driven profit in a perfectly
competitive market with no barriers to entry. In the short term, the ‘innovation’ a
yields positive profit because the firm can capture monopoly rents. But eventually,
imitators enter the market, and competition drives profits down to zero.
4 Intergenerational choice with a growing economy
and population
Let W represent society’s endowment of resources at time zero, which can either be
consumed or invested in production. Assume an exogenous ‘yield’ rate γ ≥ 1 for any
investment. Thus, if unconsumed, the endowment W will grow to size γW at time 1,
and to size γtW at time t. Thus, γ is the maximum growth rate of the economy; in
reality, the economy will grow more slowly, because some yield will be consumed, not
reinvested. A consumption stream c = (ct)
∞
t=0 ∈ RN6− is feasible if and only if
∞∑
t=0
γ−tct ≤ W. (5)
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Let pi ≥ 1 be an exogenous population growth rate, and assume that the population
at time 0 is 1, so that the population at time t is pit (presumably pi ≤ γ; otherwise we
have a Malthusian scenario). Let α ∈ (−∞, 1], and assume that per capita utility is
determined by per capita consumption x via the function uα defined: uα(x) := x
α/α
if α 6= 0 and uα(x) := log(x) if α = 0. Thus, uα is a concave, increasing function, and
u′α(x) = x
α−1, for any α ∈ (−∞, 1]. Thus, if ct is the aggregate consumption at time
t, then the per capita consumption is ct/pi
t, so the per capita utility is uα(ct/pi
t), so
the aggregate utility is pituα (ct/pi
t).
Let δ ∈ (0, 1] be a discount factor. Thus, δ < 1 if the social planner has pure time
preferences, or resorts to informational discounting as in §3.1, whereas δ = 1 if she has
no time preferences and perfect foreknowledge. The consumption stream c = (ct)
∞
t=0,
generates a (hyperreal) total future aggregate utility of
U(c) := ∗
∞∑
t=0
δtpituα(ct/pi
t) ∈ ∗R, (6)
where ∗
∑
is defined as in §1. Thus, for any t ∈ N, the marginal utility of ct is given:
∂t U(c) = δ
tpitu′α(ct/pi
t)/pit = δtpit(1−α)cα−1t . (7)
(Even if the sum (6) is hyperfinite, the derivative (7) is finite, so long as ct > 0). If
the consumption stream c optimizes U with respect to the budget constraint (5), then
there exists λ > 0 such that for all t ∈ N, we have ∂t U(c) = λγ−t. Setting t = 0 and
substituting the expression (7) we get cα−10 = λ. Thus, c satisfies:
δtpit(1−α)cα−1t = γ
−tcα−10 , ∀ t ∈ N. (8)
Let θ := pi(δγ)
1
1−α . Then simplifying (8) yields ct = θ
tc0, ∀ t ∈ N. (9)
If c is optimal, then (5) is an equality. Substituting (9) into (5), we get
W =
∞∑
t=0
γ−t ct =
∞∑
t=0
(θ/γ)t c0 (∗)
c0
1− (θ/γ) , (10)
where (∗) is true ⇐⇒
(
θ/γ < 1
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
δ <
γ−α
pi1−α
)
. (11)
(here (†) is because 1− α > 0). If (11) holds, then we deduce c0 = [1− (θ/γ)]W ; we
can then substitute this into (9) to compute the optimal consumption path.
For example, suppose α = −1 and δ = 1; then condition (11) is equivalent to
γ > pi2, while θ = pi
√
γ. Suppose population grows at 3% per year, while investment
yields 8.16%; then we have pi = 1.03 and γ = 1.0816 = (1.04)2 > pi2, so (11) is
satisfied, with θ = (1.03)(1.04) = 1.0712. Thus, c0 = [1 − (θ/γ)]W ≈ 0.0096W , and
ct = (1.0712)
t · c0. Thus, aggregate consumption (i.e. GDP) grows at 7.12% per year,
while per capita consumption grows at 4% per year.
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Note that the social planner does not aim for the maximum possible economic
growth rate of 8.16%. She sacrifices some future growth for present consumption,
because she ‘instrumentally discounts’ future prosperity, as described in §2.
If condition (11) does not hold, then the sum (10) is infinite, for any c0 > 0. This
means that the optimization problem has no nontrivial solution. Intuitively, this is
because, for any t ∈ N with ct > 0, there is always some T > t such that cT is small
enough that one can increase the value of U by decreasing ct to 0 and increasing cT to
cT + γ
T−tct —i.e. by ‘deferring’ gratification from time t to time T . Inductively, one
ends up deferring all gratification until eternity, so that ct = 0 for all t ∈ N.
If δ = 1, then this ‘Paradox of Eternal Deferral’ can occur in two opposite ways.
If α < 0, then the Paradox occurs only if γ ≤ pi1− 1α —i.e. if yield is too small, relative
to population growth. However, if α ≥ 0, then the Paradox occurs for any pi ≥ 1 and
γ > 1. In other words, if utility functions have the form u(x) = log(x) or u(x) = xα for
0 < α ≤ 1, then nondiscounted utilitarian intergenerational social choice is impossible
in a scenario of exponential economic growth.
There are three ways to resolve the Paradox. (1) Insist that α < 0 (an assump-
tion about human psychology with no a priori justification) and hope that γ is large
enough. (2) Insist that δ < 1 —i.e. either that the social planner has pure time
preferences (contradicting the rationale of this entire article) or at least, that she
‘informationally discounts’ the future as in §3.1. (3) Reject the assumption of expo-
nential economic growth. The assumption of a constant ‘yield’ γ > 1 for investment
is equivalent to a technology with constant returns to scale. If instead we assume
decreasing returns to scale, then economic growth will slow down and eventually stop
(and hopefully, population growth along with it). This seems plausible if we imagine a
society confined to a finite resource base (e.g. Planet Earth). However, this is beyond
the scope of the very simple model we have presented here.
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